The fourth seminar – organised as a part of the MoD’s sectoral Presidency training programme – took place on May 25.

At the event, Ambassador András Kós, deputy head of the Department for European Foreign and Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Péter Gyila, defence policy expert of the Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels, and Colonel Tibor Deme, EU expert of the Defence Staff Secretariat, gave presentations on the changes due to the Lisbon Treaty in the area of Common Security and Defence Policy as well as on the operation of the new institutions.

According to András Kós the Lisbon Treaty brought the most visible changes in the area of foreign and security policy. As t the European Union’s foreign relations the current institutional processes result in a great deal of uncertainty. However, the Lisbon Treaty has put an end to a ten-year institutional agony and created the legal basis necessary to materialise the vision outlined in the European Security Strategy – a more coherent EU in respect of foreign relations. One of its most important means is the European External Action Service (EEAS) that is being established now and will be the diplomatic tool for the European Union.

As András Kós pointed out, establishing the EEAS is a task more difficult than expected. One of the reasons for this is that due to the Lisbon Treaty one third of the staff of the Service will be provided by the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council each, and the third made up of the personnel delegated by the diplomatic services of the Member States. So a kind of competition between the institutions is basically coded in its decree. Even though the Ministers of Foreign Affairs reached consensus on the details of establishing the EEAS on April 26, the European Parliament (EP) – that has co-decision powers in relation of the EEAS budget and personnel – does not agree with the Council in several issues. One of the elements of the negotiations taking place with the EP is that from 2013 the EEAS will possibly be open to other EU institutions, e.g. the European Parliament, thus recruitment of the Service will rely on others than the three sources specified in the Lisbon Treaty. Concerning the principles of recruitment, the Member States have reached full consensus that in each case the best experts will have to be employed. Hungary – together with the Visegrád countries – has successfully lobbied for the inclusion of a geographical approach (‘geographical balance’) besides performance. As András Kós explained, it is necessary so that each and every Member State could perceive the EU’s foreign and security policy as their own. Without this, the foreign policy of certain countries may become ‘re-nationalised’ – moving the emphasis towards bilateral relations from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Making the process of selection for the EEAS transparent and elaborating an unambiguous competition system are important Hungarian interests.

According to the Ambassador we have to leave the current transitional period – caused by the Lisbon Treaty – behind as soon as possible since it has already made a lot of damage for the Union. Brussels lost part of its appeal not only within the EU but much more in the eyes of its partners as – under the current circumstances – they consider the European Union unpredictable and incapable of action. We can only hope that this transition period will end this year. If an agreement can be reached on the terms of reference of the EEAS with the EP by this summer, the two Deputies to the High Representative as well as the chairman of the Political and Security Committee can be designated, and the posts in the EEAS structure can be filled.

In the opinion of András Kós, the Hungarian Presidency will be greatly influenced by the time it will take to put the EEAS into operation. The problem of the Spanish Presidency is that it can be regarded as a ‘combined’ Presidency since – due to the Lisbon Treaty – the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) has already been led by the High Representative but she – lacking the institutional background provided by the EEAS – has been unable to take over the chairmanship of the working groups from the rotating presidency. The Belgian Presidency intends to hand over all the working groups to the EEAS in the course of this year in order to put an end to this transitional period. This would be favourable for Hungary because it could then avoid the unclear institutional situation that has characterised the Spanish Presidency so far.

In case of a quick establishment of the EEAS, Hungary will neither have the chance to carry out an own programme in the field of CFSP, and would play a role only in chairing the working groups still led by the rotating Presidency. In the latter case, the Hungarian diplomats would not obtain their instructions from Budapest, but would act in the name of the High Representative. During its Presidency, Hungary is expected to represent the EU in eight countries, since the Union – on the base of the existing delegations – has not managed to open its diplomatic representations in certain places. András Kós emphasized the importance of having regular consultations with the Belgian colleagues and the High Representative so that the future Hungarian Presidency could see what situation it has to expect.

Péter Gyila, defence policy expert of the Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels, started his presentation by reporting on the general changes caused by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. He also mentioned that due to the ambiguous institutional situation and the transitional period, international players outside the EU see the Union’s actions in a rater negative light.

Now it is obvious that the traditional role of the rotating Presidency – guiding the work of the FAC as well as the activities of working groups subordinated to FAC, setting up agendas and chairing – will terminate in the field of CFSP. The follow-up and support of certain priorities, by conceptual work (non-papers, food-for-thought documents) as well as by the organisation of informal Council and working-group sessions, conferences and seminars in Hungary might remain as ‘Presidency activities’. In addition to these, a kind of harmonising mechanism will probably be created between the High Representative and the Presidency, with a leading role of the High Representative.

As to the future chairmanship of certain CFSP working groups four categories can be differentiated. Working groups dealing with commercial and development policy will be chaired by the rotating Presidency in the future as well, but the High Representative will also have an outstanding role in these fields. The geographic working groups will be chaired by the representatives of the High Representative within 12 months from the establishment of the EEAS. The majority of horizontal working groups will be chaired by the HR and only a few of them – RELEX, COTER, COCON, COJUR, COMAR – will remain under the chairmanship of the Presidency. Apart from a six-month transition period, the CSDP working groups will be also chaired by the representative of the HR. For the time being the question of the chairmanship of the Steering Committee of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC SC), the ATHENA Special Committee (set up to deal with the financial aspects of military operations), and the EU-NATO Capability Group has not been decided yet. As Péter Gyila pointed out, there are further difficulties with the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), newly established within the Secretariat of the Council. The CMPD, the union of three former bodies, faces internal and structural problems. He also mentioned the divergences emerging in relation with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – to be established due to the Lisbon Treaty – and the difficulties related to the transformation of the ESDC as well as to the EDA.

Colonel Tibor Deme introduced the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU military structures. After outlining the EU military institutions, he described the processes influencing the Hungarian Presidency in details. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) – the highest military body of the Council – has less chances to influence the capability development processes because of the new or transformed institutional players in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) – set up in order to support the EUMC – faces a permanent lack of personnel which makes it difficult to carry out its tasks. Another problem is that the EUMS – that supports the EUMC but is not directly subordinated to it – is has been transformed. Due to the normal staff rotation, almost 40 per cent of the personnel will leave the system this year, causing a significant decrease in expertise.

The Working Group of the EU Military Committee (EUMCWG), which implements the tasks specified by the EUMC, retains basically its tasks but functions with an increasing workload and is unfavourably influenced by the lack of personnel in the EUMS.

The role of the rotating Presidency has not significantly changed in neither bodies since they have been working under the permanent elected chairmen. According to Tibor Deme, the most important task of the capability development format of the EUMCWG (EUMCWG/HTF) has been the follow-up of the capability development process arising form the Headline Goal. However, its scope of duties has already been depleted by now. Certain member states use it as the means to protect their political interests, and because of this its existence, work and future has always been discussed. Its new permanent leader has an 18-month mandate. The member state providing the rotating Presidency can delegate an action officer as a voluntary national contribution (if it so wishes) in order to assist the work of the body (Hungary declined this possibility). Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the plans concerning the reinforcment of the EU section of the Office of the Military Representative of the Hungarian Defence Forces for the period of EU Presidency as well as its permanent enlargement have changed to a great extent. Permanent enlargement has been postponed to a later date but the reinforcement can be realised step by step with personnel originally envisaged for the EUMCWG/HTF from 1st July, as the termination of Presidency tasks is not present as to military tasks.